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THE SOVIET IiPACT oN-z THE "WESTERN WORLD. By Edward Hallett Carr.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. Pp. 113. $1.75.
IT hardly needs argument that the major fact in the world today is the
issue between Soviet Russia and the traditional democracies. If a wise and
informed position with respect to this issue is to be taken by any person or
any nation, not merely the traditional democracies but also Soviet Russia
must be understood. Edward Hallett Carr's The Soviet Impact on the Western
World provides one of the best brief introductions to such an understanding.
Although his emphasis is upon "impact," he makes it evident from the
very outset that this impact cannot be understood unless the ideological
assumptions from which it proceeds are grasped. Consequently, the book
is also important because it is a specific example of the new ideological ap-
proach to economic, political, legal and international questions.
To understand Professor Carr's book we must first consider certain fac-
tors which have made this new approach necessary. One factor is obvious:
namely, the inescapable ideological conflicts of the contemporary world.
The issue between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. is but one instance of these
conflicts. There is a less exaggerated but nonetheless real conflict between
the economic and political ideology of the U.S.A. at the present moment
and that of the British Labor government. There would also be a conflict
between the present ideology of the U.S.A. and that of the British govern-
ment were the Labor government to be superseded by a Conservative gov-
ernment. For the younger leaders of the British Conservative party are for
a continuation of the present nationalization of British banking and industry.
As this reviewer noted in the chapter on British democracy in The Meeting
of East and West, a Conservative in Great Britian is fundamentally different
from a Conservative in the United States. The American Conservative goes
back to the laissez-faire economic theory of Adam Smith, Mill, Jevons and
the Austrian School and to the laissez-faire individualistic political theory
of John Locke. This type of Conservative passed out of existence in Great
Britain with the death of the Whig party at the opening of the nineteenth
century. To be sure, it took on a new form with the utilitarian hedonism of
Bentham and the attendant British Liberal party. But the British Liberal
party has also become practically extinct in contemporary British politics.
A British Conservative goes back to Hooker and the Tudors, and they, in
turn, rest upon Aristotle, who regarded politics not, as did Locke, a necessary
evil, but as part pf man's essential nature and hence a positive good.
There is a similar conflict between the more Lockean laissez-faire ideolog-
ical assumptions of the traditional U.S.A. and the more psychological and
emotive values of the Latin-American world. And an even deeper-going and
older ideological conflict is coming to the fore in contemporary international
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politics at the present moment in the problem confronting Japan, China and
India of combining the traditional-Oriental social and cultural institutions
with those of the traditional West.
A second consideration leading to this new ideological approach to social
and international problems results from the development of the social sci-
ences in the modern West. This development exhibits itself in recent modern
theories of jurisprudence. The positivistic, analytic theory of law of Austin
has been followed by the more formalistic theory of Kelsen and the neo-
Kantians, by the historical theory of Maine, and by the sociological theory
of Montesquieu, Ehrlich, Professor Pound and their followers. The legal
realism of Professor Llewellyn and his colleagues belongs to this latter group,
since it conceives of the law in terms of the actual decisions and doings of
judges in a social context. The sociological character of law as power decis-
sions affecting values, as conceived by Professors Lasswell and McDougal,
is equally obvious.
This sociological approach, however, as initially formulated was more ver-
bal than scientific. Either it spent more time talking about being scientific
than in actually pursuing scientific investigations, or, as in the case of Ehr-
lich, the scientific studies referred merely to books about societies often so
distant in the past that the conclusions reached were difficult to check. Grad-
ually, however, these weaknesses have been removed by two developments:
one, the rigorous application of the methods of natural science to social
phenomena of a legal nature by Professor Underhill Moore; and, two, the
natural history descriptive field studies of different contemporary societies
described by Malinowski and many other cultural anthropologists and soci-
ologists.
It was thought for a considerable time that this would provide law and
social science generally with a scientifically grounded theory. However, it
soon became evident that this was not the case. Completely different societies
tended to be conceived in terms of the descriptive or analytic concepts of
the particular anthropologist or sociologist who happened to be doing the
describing. This provided a different analysis than might have resulted from
a description of social or cultural institutions of any given people as con-
ceived by the people themselves. Hence, analysis cast in the semantic and
ideological framework of the modern Western anthropologist has failed to
detect the diverse legal and normative social prescriptions of the societies
investigated.
The limitations of this approach showed themselves in two ways. First,
different sociologists and cultural anthropologists, using different descrip-
tive or analytic concepts for describing, classifying and coordinating the
same observable data, arrived at different conclusions. Different sociological
theories developed from different sociological schools. Second, any given
school, since its particular sociological concepts applied to all societies, could
throw little light upon the ideological conflicts which prevent diverse societies
from cooperating in international enterprises.
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Reflection upon this situation by the younger generation of anthropolo-
gists and sociologists in our midst has gradually revealed the cause of the
trouble. The inductive Baconian method of natural history description has
surreptitiously smuggled in the sociologists' concepts, in terms of which any
society is to be conceived. What is required, therefore, is to introduce a
scientific method which enables one to describe a given society in terms of
the concepts used by the people in that society with respect to their owm
social institutions and practices. Thus Professor Clyde Kluckhohn, for ex-
ample, came to the conclusion that one simply cannot understand the insti-
tutions and practices of the Navaho Indians unless one stays with their
practices long enough to discover the ideological assumptions or, as he terms
it, the philosophy, from which their institutions and practices proceed.'
This line of reasoning has, among other things, led to the complete explo-
sion of Lv-Bruhl's theory that the so-called primitive peoples think illogic-
ally. They only seem to think illogically for anthropologists and sociologists
who look at social institutions from ideological assumptions other than those
of the people in question. Once the ideology-the philosophy-of the so-
called primitive people is determined, then their thinking exhibits itself as
thoroughly logical.
Thus it is that more scientific attention upon and practice of scientific
method with the attendant less naive conception of scientific description,
together with the natural development of the historical and the sociological
approach to law and cultural anthropology, has led directly to the ideological
approach to economic, political, legal and international problems.
It is in this context that Edward Hallett Carr's book is to be viewed. It is
concerned, among other things, with revealing some of the ideological as-
sumptions behind the behavior of the Soviet Union, so that one senses them
as a positive good, after the manner in which a believing communist con-
ceives of them. Professor Carr is trying to do for the contemporary Soviet
Russians precisely what the anthropologist Professor Clyde Kluckhohn has
done in his past and forthcoming writings on the philosophy of the Navaho
Indians.
This precise nature of what Professor Carr is doing must be kept in mind
in evaluating his book. The enthusiasm and moral fervor with which he ends
the volume suggests that he has not kept it in mind. The book proves noth-
ing concerning the validity of the particular ideological premises from which
the Soviet Russians proceed. It stands on all fours with Professor Kluck-
hohn's book upon the premises from which the institutions and practices of
the Navaho Indians proceed. No one would suppose that when Professor
Kluckhohn brings out into the open the ideological assumptions of the Nav-
aho Indians in a manner which vividly fills one's imagination and enables
one to sense how the Navahos could be moved by such an ideology and re-
1. RADiN, PRiMrrIvE MAN AS PHLOSOPHER (1927). KLUCKnOHN AND Lrmanzo.;,
THE NAvAHO (1944).
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gard it as their criterion of the good, this proves anything with respect to
the scientific validity of the Navahos' ideological assumptions. The ques-
tion concerning which set of ideological premises is the scientifically correct
one is a question with respect to which Professor Carr's book and the fore-
going analysis of recent developments in legal, anthropological and socio-
logical theory throws little light.
The main problem in contemporary legal, anthropological, historical and
sociological methodology is that of finding the scientific method by means
of which, after having brought the ideological assumptions of the major
nations, cultures and political parties of the world out into the open, one
determines which one, if any, is scientifically correct. There is evidence that
the solution to this problem is at hand. Professor Carr's book, however,
throws no light upon it. It must be read solely as a study in the logical analy-
sis of Soviet institutions and practices, with the aim of bringing out and
making psychologically persuasive the ideological premises-economic, polit-
ical and moral-from which they proceed. The results of his analysis merit
consideration in detail.
The author makes it abundantly clear that the Soviet Russians' use of the
word "democracy" is far from being the dishonest use of the word for purely
propagandist purposes which it is thought to be by most people who look
at Soviet pronouncements and behavior from non-communistic ideological
standpoints. First Professor Carr points out that Russian thought derives
from the continental and French concept of democracy rather than from
the British and Anglo-American concept, and that this makes a profound
difference in what one means by the word. The British concept of democ-
racy derives from Locke and Hooker. The traditional concept in the United
States derives almost entirely from Locke. The French and continental con-
cept, on the other hand, while deriving in part, by way of Voltaire, from
Locke, rests heavily on Rousseau. This makes a tremendous difference.
Rousseau regarded all traditional institutions as corruptions of a state of
nature and hence, in considerable part, evil. This means that the good is
always to be obtained by rejection of the status quo. Thus in one's demo-
cratic theory, to be a follower of Rousseau rather than merely of Locke is
to tend to emphasize revolution as the essence of democracy. This undoubt-
edly is in part what Lenin meant when he said that the philosophy of Marx
derives from the three major nineteenth-century achievements of the three
major nations of the modem world, namely, German philosophy, British
economic science and French revolutionary socialism.
But Rousseau's contribution to the concept of democracy differs from
that of Locke in a second and even more profound way. For Locke, because
of his conception of a person as a local, atomic, mental substance, the good
for man is always predominantly private, egocentric and individualistic.
Thus Lockean democracy, as exhibited in the institutions of Great Britain
and the United States, distinguishes between government and man in society
[Vol, 57
REVIEWS
and so formulates government that government becomes largely an instru-
ment for protecting individuals and their private property even against it-
self. Rousseau, on the other hand, emphasizes the "general will." Thus in
Rousseau's concept of democracy the aim of government is to insure the
expression of the general will. From this, as Carr notes, it becomes bad and
a betrayal of democracy for the individual to fail to accept the general will.
Thus if one accepts the Rousseauian, continental, concept of democracy,
individual deviation from the general will, as recorded in governmental ac-
tion, tends to be regarded as an evil rather than a good. This throws con-
siderable light upon the Germans' and the Russians' rough treatment of
minority groups and non-conformist leaders at the same time Russian and
German statesmen are affirming their defense and preservation of "democ-
racy."
Professor Carr points out also that the Revolution of 1848 has had an
important bearing upon the Continental European conception of democracy.
The Russians regard this Revolution as a movement which shifted Conti-
nental, even French Continental, democratic thought from the Rousseauian
to the Lockean conception of democracy. Hence, for the Russians it was a
literal betrayal of democracy.
This is but one instance of the manner in which the ideological approach
to the use of words like "democracy" or "freedom" in domestic politics or
international relations prevents one from falling into the L6vy-Bruhl error
of attributing inconsistency and verbal duplicity to political or national
leaders when their deeds do not seem to conform to their pronouncements.
The apparent inconsistency often has its basis in the fact that reading into
the words of one's adversary the meanings those words have upon the basis
of one's own. ideological premises destroys the meanings which they have for
one's adversary. When this is done, all his pronouncements and behavior
will appear to be shot through with duplicity and with logical inconsistency.
The ideological approach to legal, social and international problems which
Professor Carr illustrates prevents such elementary errors.
One other specific achievement of his book merits attention. It may seem
paradoxical that the Marxist philosophy, which rejects the Hegelian role of
ideas in social institutions, should be understandable only by paying atten-
tion to the ideas upon which the philosophy rests. The paradox evaporates,
however, when one notes that the Marxist theory that naturalistic economic
and dialectically historical factors determine the character of social institu-
tions at a given time is itself an idea. Economic need alone does not bring
in a communistic revolution. Otherwise the communistic revolution would
have occurred in China thousands of years ago, since economic need exhibit-
ing itself in the death of millions from starvation annually has existed in
China since the beginning of its recorded history. It is, as Professor Carr
points out, not economic need but the concept of economic need to be re-
moved by the revolution of the proletariat which is the key thesis of corn-
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munism. The need as fact and the concept of the need as a moving slogan
in social reconstruction are two quite different things.
Professor Carr also explodes the notion that the communist leaders are
guided by nothing but a hard-boiled power politics realism, after the manner
of the prescription of the late Nicholas Spykman and the persisting advice
of the Yale Institute of International Studies. The writings of all the leaders
of communist action and thought show that they have nothing but utter
contempt for such non-ideologically guided power politics realism, They
know very well that there is no such thing as mere powee politics. The power
is wasted unless it has a direction. Power by itself is neutral with respect
to the direction it takes. Hence, without an ideology power politics is stupid
and also ineffective, since it is continually extemporizing the direction it
takes, while pretending to have no interest in the ideas which define the
direction. The result is a national policy which vacillates, reverses.itself and
generally results in ineptitude.
The crucial role of the ideological factor, even with realistically minded
Russians, is brought out by Carr in another way. "A true revolution," he
writes, "is never content merely to expose the abuses of the existing order,
the cases in which its practice falls short of its precept, but attacks at their
root the values on which the moral authority of the existing order is based." 2
He emphasizes that the communist recognizes this unequivocally. This has
important consequences. It means that one will never meet the communist
ideology or the point of this ideology by admitting that the traditional demo-
cratic doctrines, like all ideologies, have not fully achieved their ideal and
by proposing that we make them more effective in realizing their aims. As
Professor Carr points out, the criticism of one ideology by another ideology
is a criticism of the aims of the other ideology, even if they were perfectly
actualized. That this is the case is shown by the attitude of citizens of the
United States with respect to the ideology of the Divine Right of Kings. The
defenders of monarchy and aristocracy would not meet the objections of the
traditional Anglo-American democrats to monarchy and aristocracy, even
if the monarchists achieved their ideal perfectly. It is not the inefficiency of
monarchs merely which is objected to, but a type of political organization
in which, an aristocratic few rather than the democratic many decide the
type of social organization within which the democratic many must live.
Once this point is grasped, the prevalent notion of American pragmatists
and many social scientists such as the legal realist Walter Wheeler Cook,
that one can resolve normative moral and social questions in terms of the
pragmatic efficiency or effectiveness of different normative hypotheses, ex-
hibits its futility. The whole criterion of efficiency and of the norm with re-
spect to which efficiency is to be measured is the point at issue in any major
•ideological conflict between two political parties or between two nations.




Carr's book. This weakness appears in its final portion. The very nature of
the method which Professor Carr is pursuing, the method of bringing out
into the open the ideological assumptions from which the institutions and
practices of Soviet Russia proceed, is a method which throws little or no
light on the validity of those premises. This method, if applied to any cul-
ture or any ideology, will make that ideology imaginatively vivid and sub-
jectively persuasive, if it is honestly and scientifically carried through. Yet
it is difficult to escape the conclusion, when finishing Professor Carr's book,
that he believes that he has shown not merely the intellectually honest and
logically consistent assumptions from which Soviet practices and institutions
stem but also that he has, in part at least, shown their validity. The very
nature of the method he is using gives the lie to any such conclusion.
The reason for this erroneous suggestion upon Professor Carr's part is
not difficult to find. He is caught still in the naive natural history descriptive
approach of followers of the historical method in social science. Surrepti-
tiously he slips in the assumption that the Hegelian dialectical and Feuer-
bachian materialistic, Marxist conceptual framework for working at and
evaluating the facts of history is a fact of history apart from the conceptual
standpoint. But Professor Carr is not alone in this naive error. The Hege-
lians and Marxists before him fell into it also.
The error centers at bottom in confusing the vague intuitive notion of
historical trends (any one of which is an abstraction of certain facts from the
sequence of all historical facts, to the neglect of all others) with the more
precise scientific concept of causality. There is no evidence whatever from
history or any of the social sciences that social scientists have achieved a
causal theory of the temporal sequence of historical or social phenomena.
Even for that branch of the social sciences which is the most quantitatively
exact and theoretically mature, namely, economics, most competent students
are agreed that they have merely an economic statics and not an economic
dynamics. This is but another way of saying with scientific precision that
causal relations between present and future historical or social phenomena
have not been scientifically established. Yet it is only by confusing the vague
intuitive, arbitrarily abstracted notion of an historical trend with the scien-
tifically exact notion of causality that the Marxists, and Professor Carr fol-
lowing them, can suggest that if one wants to be on the historical band wagon
which is moving into the supposedly inevitable future, one must be a com-
munist.
This does not mean that the premises of the communistic ideology may
not turn out in part at least to be correct when the scientific method for
determining the correctness of one set of ideological premises rather than
another is determined and applied. The point merely is that there is nothing
in what Professor Carr has done or in what the Hegelians or Marxists before
him have done which enables one to give a trustworthy answer to this crucial
question.
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Professor Carr's book, therefore, is important if it is taken solely for what
it is, namely, an analysis and designation of some of the ideological assump-
tions from which contemporary Soviet pronouncements, institutions and
actions consistently stem. The other major ideologies of the contemporary
world, Oriental as well as Western, need to be similarly treated. When this
is done, the basic problem or problems to which these rival sets of premises
are rival answers should then become evident. An analysis of these basic
problems should guide one scientifically to the criterion for their solution.'
Only when these additional supplements to Professor Carr's important but
restricted inquiry are provided will one be in any position to pass an objec-
tive judgment upon the validity of the Soviet or any other social ideology.
It would be a mistake to leave the impression that Professor Carr's book
is concerned only with ideological factors. Only one chapter in the book
bears this title. A reading of the other chapters will indicate, however, that
ideological factors are present there also. Nonetheless, the administrative
side of social organization receives considerable treatment. Professor Carr
makes it clear that the administrative programs which are in considerable
part at least a consequence of the Soviet policy or ideology have had a tre-
mendous effect upon nations which have not accepted the ideology. Thus
his book is important for its practical as well as its theoretical significance.
F. S. C. NORT1ROPt
DANGEROUS WORDS. By Philip Wittenberg. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1947. Pp. 335. $5.00.
THE words the author of this book discusses are not those which threaten
revolution or which otherwise affect the security of the state, but defamatory
words concerning individuals and groups. Since the book is intended not
for lawyers but for writers, editors and publishers, it is quite properly de-
scribed as a guide rather than a treatise.
To a considerable extent purpose has here determined form and content.
The author gives us no general discussion of the law of libel or the various
elements which compose it, but on the other hand he gives us an interesting
and extensive assemblage of instances. In an appendix he has chronologically
listed, under various classifications, the great variety of expressions which the
courts have at one time or another considered libelous. This list opens with
an 1812 New York holding regarding an accusation of false swearing and
comes down to a 1947 Illinois decision about Communists. In between lies
3. Such an analysis has been carried through in the present reviewer's THE MEET-
ING OF EAST AND WEST (1946). The attendant scientific method for determining the
correct social ideology is specified in detail in his THE LoGic OF THE ScIEHNcs AND THE
HUmANITrSs (1947).
t Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law, Yale School of Law.
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a fair sampling of expressions which touch upon the seamier side of American
life, political, religious and professional.
Wittenberg concerns himself particularly with the difficulties confronting
today's purveyors of information who have to rely on material supplied by
others. He is concerned especially with the syndicated newspaper and the
radio and points out the curiously divergent rulings which can occur when
the same material becomes the basis for litigation commenced in different
states.' Wittenberg also comments on the difficulty the courts of various
states have had in determining whether radio broadcasts should be governed
by the law of libel or of slander. Unfortunately he does not make clear
wherein lies the importance of this difference.
To meet the difficulties regarding diffusion over large areas, the author
suggests that Congress exercise its power over interstate commerce to pre-
scribe rules of liability. He believes it should also lay down a uniform rule
regarding the privilege to discuss the acts of public officials. Aside from in-
dicating, however, that there should be protection "for the unwitting news-
paper or radio station which receives its material from afar", he offers no
particular rule for Congress to adopt and it is doubtful whether a federal
rule would really accomplish the greater uniformity which he indicates is
desirable. Might it not merely be adding a 49th rule, when in most cases
an astute person could find some wholly intrastate use of the objectionable
material involved?
The book deals at some length with the always live subject of political
criticism, but without adequate distinction between "priilege" and "fair
comment" or their role as defenses. Criticism of works of art comes under
the heading "Professional Persons" and therefore finds itself side by side
with the discussion of the special rules which govern libels of a man in his
business or profession. 2 The two things seem to this reviewer to be unrelated.
There is a discussion of group libel and minority groups, in the course of
which Wittenberg takes cognizance of some of the current proposals to pun-
ish libels of groups in respect of their race or religion. One would like to have
seen a more extensive discussion of the arguments for and against these
proposals, and also of the constitutional issues involved.
The book at various places includes extensive quotations from or para-
phrases of state statutes, the usefulness of which seems doubtful. It is hardly
to be expected that the ordinary layman will grasp the significance of the
words used, and no lawyer will be satisfied by a reference to statutes made
in so informal a fashion. These portions of the book might perhaps better
have been relegated to an appendix containing precise documentation.
1. Pp. 145-55. In the first discussion Mr. Wittenberg falls into error in stating that
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in one of these cases, since in fact
certiorari was granted and the decision below affirmed by an evenly divided court.
2. Actually the author in discussing each of these separately makes it appear that
particular groups are "favored" by the law, whereas the law merely protects persons who
are libeled in their professions or businesses.
19481
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The author has adopted the useful device of referring in the text to the
names of the important cases he discusses without burdening the book with
footnotes, leaving it to the more interested reader to find the citation of the
case in an appended table. It might have been helpful to have added dates
to this table. Indeed, with reference to the very first case cited, the omission
of the date makes finding the case impossible.
The book lacks a sufficient discussion of seditious libel and of criminal
libel, although some of the differences between civil and criminal liability
are indicated, as in the chapters on libel of the dead and on truth as a de-
fense. It has also no real discussion of the subject of special damages, which
one would suppose of interest to laymen as well as lawyers. And it ignores
altogether the cognate field of the right of privacy and the statutes which
protect it.
There are places in which better editing would have avoided ambiguities
and repetition I and others where technical terms of the law, such as libel
per se, are introduced without adequate explanation for the lay reader.
OSMOND K. FRAENKELt
THEY BUILDED BETTER THAN THEY KNEW. By Julius Henry Cohen. New
York: Julian Messner Inc., 1947. Pp. 376. $3.75.
THIS is really Julius Henry Cohen's autobiography because, while he in-
troduces a long and varied list of public-minded and distinguished figures,
particularly in the public life of New York City, he treats them in chrono-
logical sequence from his own early days up to the present time. His use of
these men and women as pegs upon which to hang his life story makes for
a somewhat rambling and discursive book which could have been condensed
if it had been a straight autobiography.
The author groups his heroes in the main divisions: (1) Bending the Twig;
(2) Orchids Grow in Swampy Grounds (Theodore Roosevelt, William M.
Ivins, Alfred E. Smith); (3) The Women Take Over; (4) The Law Moves For-
ward; (5) Trial and Error in Industry (Max Meyer, Louis D. Brandeis, Mor-
ris Hillquit, Meyer London, John A. Dyche, Dr. George M. Price, Belle
Lindner Moscowitz); (6) New Times-New Instrumentalism. The fifth and
sixth divisions are the most important because they cover the introduction
of collective bargaining into the women's wear industry and the establish-
ment of the Port of New York Authority as an early example of a successful
public corporation. As the reader may have guessed, the "swampy grounds"
of the second division are the environs of Tammany Hall. In some of the
subdivisions of the book its author abandons the personality peg; the St.
3. See pp. 18 and 20, 45 and 46, 54 and 55, 271 and 273.
t Member of the New York Bar.
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Lawrence Power Authority, the Conference on State Defense and Rent
Cases can not be conveniently treated as the work of individual personalities.
Perhaps this book is the preliminary draft for a more extensive autobi-
ography since Mr. Cohen is a victim of lubido scribendi and has already vait-
ten four books and a large number of papers. However, men and women
here remembered greatly influenced our thought and pioneered courageously
in many fields during the last 50 years in New York City. There are many
serious reflections arising from Cohen's legal practice, stories grave and gay
and many apt quotations. While not all the thumbnail sketches come off,
many of them rescue worthy men and women from undeserved obscurity.
Sometimes, in the judgment of this reviewer, Cohen is too cryptic. For
example, he endeavors to picture two outstanding leaders of needle trades
unions in one sentence: "The difference between Hillman and Dubinsky is
just this: Dubinsky is astute, while Hillman is shrewd." 1 In most dictionaries
the two underli ed words are synonymous, but people who have met and
worked with both men maintain that neither of them was lacking in the
cunning and finesse which are necessary in dealing with some of the manufac-
turers of the garment industry.
In the first adoption of collective bargaining practices in the small-scale,
competition-ridden garment industry which created (under the leadership
of Louis Brandeis) the ambitious union agreement known as the Protocol,
Cohen played a leading part on the side of the employers. Some commenta-
tors think that his account exaggerates the importance of his own role. How-
ever, there is something to be said for his view that both he and John A.
Dyche were expendable. The manufacturers thought that Cohen went too
far in his efforts to cooperate with the Union, and the ILGWU members
and the leaders who were Dyche's rivals thought that he, in turn, was too
rigid in his effort to enforce compliance with the agreement. (Dyche took
the agreement so seriously that, without attempts at persuasion, he sent in
union members to break the strikes and stoppages which the members had
called in defiance of the settlement procedures laid down in the agreement.)
It took some years before all the manufacturers were prepared to accept the
Union as a permanent institution without which they could not operate the
industry. And it also took time for the Union to gain strength and perma-
nence and to exchange the psychology of conflict for one of possible coopera-
tion. It is only natural for Cohen to feel the "spurns that patient merit from
the unworthy takes" when he looks back and feels that others reaped where
he had sowed because he and Dyche were ahead of their time. Cohen ap-
parently had little sympathy or understanding of the mass agitational move-
ment of the exploited workers and he felt that the use of the injunction in
1910, obtained by him for the employers to stop peaceful picketing, was
justified. The full evaluation of that period and its personalities is probably
still to be made.
1. P. 188.
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The author's suggestion that references to Dyche have not been permitted
officially by the Union seems to me unjustified. He himself notes that in
Benjamin Stolberg's sophisticated and cynical Tailor's Progress some recog-
nition is made. Certainly Joel Seidman, from whose The Needle Trades
Cohen makes many quotations, was under no official pressures. Dyche wrote
his own version of his defeat which he took very bitterly. In his later days
he received some help and assistance from the union, although perhaps
Cohen is right when he suggests that more credit is due.
As a stickler for details, Cohen will correct the reference to 840,000 workers
in women's wear in 1910,2 which is nearly double even the present total.
Harold U. (not V.) Faulkner is not the joint author of "Workers Education
in the United States" but of "Labor in America." I His laudatory reference
to Frederick H. Ecker in housing does not mention, as does To Secure These
Rights, the recent Report of the President's Commission on Civil Rights,
the segregation practised by Mr. Ecker as head of Metropolitan Life.
Mr. Cohen served as consultant and legal aid to many good causes-
housing, arbitration, collective bargaining, public corporations-most of
which have won recognition. His natural preoccupation with yesteryear
gives some valuable insights on the early days of men and women who cer-
tainly builded better than they knew.
MARK STARRt
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS. By Arthur Nussbaum. New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1947. Pp. 361. $4.50.
PROF. NuSSBAum's book covers the entire history of the theory and prac-
tice of international law from 3,100 B.C.-the date of a compact between
two Mesopotamian cities which may be classified as the first known interna-
tional treaty-to the Second World War.
In the first chapter the author briefly outlines certain institutes of the
ancient Orient and of the classic world, such as the Greek proxenoi and Ro-
man fetiales, which were somewhat related to international law or rather
international relations. In the following chapter which covers "The Middle
Ages" from the fall of Rome until the end of the Fifteenth Century, the
author, having remarked that "notwithstanding the enduring authority of
the Corpus Juris Civilis, still considered imperial law, ecclesiastical law was
the dominant type of universal law in the Middle Ages,"1 examines the in-
fluence of religious concepts on the law of treaties, arbitration and warfare.
2. P. 224.
3. P. 355.




He devotes special attention to the intercourse of the Italian city states, to
commercial treaties and, in the field of legal theory, to the doctrines of the
"just war" and projects for perpetual peace. The author points out in his next
chapter that the Sixteenth Century -was characterized in the field of the law
of nations by certain legal aspects of geographical discoveries and by. the
rise of independent states which denied the superior authority of the Holy
Roman Emperor. But the author is chiefly interested in the work of various
writers: Vitoria and Suarez, who analysed problems relating to the funda-
mentals of international law, D'Ayala and Belli, who expounded the laws
of warfare, and, finally, Gentili, who wrote treatises on subjects, like embas-
sies and the law of war, within the scope of international law. In the chapter
on the "Seventeenth Century" the author emphasizes the further develop-
ment of national states and the weakening of the Holy Roman Empire and
the Catholic Church as political powers. While some attention is given to
the practice of international law, especially in the field of diplomatic law
and commercial treaties, the chapter deals mainly with the works of various
scholars: Grotius, to whom the better part of the chapter is devoted, Hobbes
and Pufendorf, who questioned the existence of jus gentium, and the English-
man Zouche and the German Rachel, who were the first to undertake a
systematic treatment of the whole field of international law. The author
pointing out in his chapter on the "Eighteenth Century" that "On the
whole, the changes in international law were moderate,"2 proceeds to analyse
the works of Bynkershoek, Wolff, Moser, Georg Friedrich von Martens and
Vattel, charging Vattel with "general weakness of reasoning aggravated by
lack of legal training." '
A real advance in the law of nations took place, according to Prof. Nuss-
baum, during the Nineteenth Century. After a brief examination of certain
theories, such as the principles of the Holy Alliance and the Monroe Doc-
trine, which he holds to be of a political rather than a legal nature, the author
emphasizes certain changes which took place in the rules relating to consuls,
the development of various types of treaties of commerce, and especially
the substantial increase in the amount of written international law through
the conclusion of a great number of treaties on various subject matters. He
also points out that in the field of legal studies, the Nineteenth Century is
characterized by a trend toward the positivist method of research and by
the publication of a great number of treatises on international law.
The last chapter is devoted to "The Twentieth Century: 1900-1939."
The author is especially interested in the legal features of the peace treaties
concluding the First World War, in various multilateral treaties creating
international agencies, and in the development of certain judicial bodies
such as the Permanent Court of International Justice. The author also
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reconsidered the fundamentals of international law. There is also a cursory
analysis of the Nazi and Russian theories on international law.
Prof. Nussbaum's task was not an easy one. While the history of certain
aspects and institutes of the law of nations, such as neutrality and consuls,
has been the object of accurate and successful research, general histories
of the law of nations are very few and many of them are of limited value. In
fact, some of them are obsolete and many are nothing more than an attempt
to justify certain political ideologies of their authors. No basic pattern of re-
search has been established as yet which may be of real assistance to one
who engages in the study of the history of the law of nations.
The author has achieved a real tour de force by condensing the whole sub-
ject matter in less than 300 pages. More than 60 pages consist of a sketchy
"Survey of the Historiography of International Law," of some useful bibli-
ographical notes and of the index. The book is always entertaining and very
often provocative, benefitting greatly from the fact that the author's knowl-
edge is by no means limited to international law. It constitutes prescribed
reading for anybody who is interested in the history of the law of nations.
The author's treatment of the subject matter raises certain problems of
method which deserve special attention. The book shows some imbalance
between the treatment of the theory and the practice of international law.
By definition, a history of the law of nations should be chiefly concerned
with international institutes, and, therefore, with the practice of interna-
tional law. However, a major portion of the work is devoted to what the
author calls "Doctrinary and Literary Developments" and to an analysis
of the writings of a few authors. The result is that the reader gathers the
impression that the practice of international law hardly came into existence
until the Congress of Vienna in the Nineteenth Century. Such a conclusion
would be obviously incorrect, for it can easily be demonstrated that many
practices, which are within the scope of international law as it is now under-
stood, were followed in certain parts of Europe and in the entire Mediter-
ranean area during the Middle Ages and that the formative period of modern
international law is to be found in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Cen-
turies.
4
The method followed by the author in his account of the doctrines of
international law is also questionable. In fact, he is almost exclusively con-
cerned with the analysis and criticism of the work of the few select writers
mentioned above. Unfortunately, many of them belong to the archeology
rather than to the history of international law. Prof. Nussbaum, who pro-
fesses but little esteem for a great number of those writers, readily admits
that many of them are recent discoveries. Their relationship to international
law is by no means comparable to that of Coke or Blackstone to English law.
In truth most of them had little influence, if any, on the actual develop-
4. See Sereni, THE ITALIAN CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118-24, 147-8
(1943).
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ment of international law. Continental practitioners who dealt at the time
of Rachel, Christian Wolff and Moser with problems which would now be
considered within the scope of international law, did not quote as author-
ities the writings of those authors, but rather invoked the Corpus Juris
Civilis, Bartolus, Baldus, Alciatus and the French Civilians. Furthermore,
apart from any criticism as to the choice of the authors who deserve special
attention in a book of this kind, it must be pointed out that a history of the
doctrines of international law should be concerned with general principles
rather than with details. While not disregarding the particular contribution
of a few outstanding scholars to the development of the law of nations, such
a history should devote more attention to the much greater influence exer-
cised over international law by certain basic doctrines which molded the
legal and political thought of the various ages. The doctrine of the post-
glossators on the powers of the Holy Roman Emperor while exalting his spir-
itual dominion over the whole world actually denied his political authority
over the various peoples, and laid a legal foundation for the evolution of the
Holy Roman Empire into the international community.The Italian theory
of the civitates superiorem non recognoscentes led to the theory of the inde-
pendency of States. And the doctrine that "Rex in regno suo est imperator
in regno suo," first expounded by the Italians and later developed by the
French Civilians, was one of the foundations of the theory of the equality
of states. Attention should also be given to the Spanish theories on the re-
lationship between the metropolitan territory and the American pos-sessions.
Up to the Nineteenth Century, however, these legal theories, which played
a pre-eminent role in the development of the law of nations, were not ex-
pounded by professional international lawyers. They are to be found in-
stead in the writings of the great private and constitutional lawyers. Bar-
tolus and Bodin have a much better claim to a conspicuous place in a general
history of international law then a Rachel or a Christian Wolff.
The practice of international law should also be treated in a manner con-
sonant with the peculiar features of the law of nations and of its develop-
ment. Changes in the structure of the international community have been
so many and so radical throughout the centuries that there is not even sub-
stantial agreement as to the time when such community and the laws govern-
ing it came into existence. Yet there is a continuity in the development of
the international organization and of the international community. The
main task of the historian should consist therefore in showing the slow but
continuing development of the law of nations. As a convenient and practical
basis for the treatment of the subject matter, an historian should bear in
mind the peculiar structure, problems and trends of the international com-
munity and of international law as they now exist. His task should be to
examine the development of such trends and problems throughout the ages.
However, he should not overlook the different problems and trends which
existed in the international community at different times, the reasons for
them and their influence on the structure of the international community
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and the development of the law of nations. Reasonable adherence to this
method will enable a writer to show the main trends and problems of inter-
national law in their proper light, thus also clarifying their current implica-
tions. This approach would be also a stimulating one, for the measure of an
historian's genius is shown by his ability to describe the brilliant pageant of
international law through a cycle of comprehensive frescoes, rich in color and
deep in perspective, rather than through a dull succession of disjointed still-
lifes.
It should be pointed out that the basic principles and trends of interna-
tional law are very few and can easily be traced through the centuries. Some
of the more important are: the rise and expansion of the international com-
munity, the organization of agencies and bodies tending to strengthen its
structure, the trend of the various members of that community toward
mutual independence and equality, and the legal justification of the binding
force of treaties.
According to the method outlined above, the artificial subdivision of the
subject matter by centuries should be discarded in favor of an analysis by
broad periods and topics. Thus, in the chapter or chapters devoted to the
development of the international organization, the historian should examine
those features of the Holy Roman Empire which may be classified as inter-
national or supra-national, the Empire's trend toward universality and the
final failure of its effort in that direction as a result of the growth and opposi-
tion of the various independent nations. He should also examine the gradual
weakening of the international community through excessive claims to in-
dependence of the various states and, as a reaction to that evil, the subse-
quent attempts to strengthen the international community through an ever-
increasing number of special bilateral and multi-lateral agreements and
through the organization of various international agencies and bodies, in-
cluding the League of Nations and, now, the United Nations. In dealing
with the development of independent states, an historian should describe
the early struggle of various powers against the Emperor, the rise of the
great monarchies and independent republics-especially remarkable since
the Fifteenth Century-and, finally, the peculiar features of the modern
states which are of interest to international law. It should be shown that
modem states, while jealously asserting their own independence in their
mutual relations, often achieved territorial expansion, especially in other
continents, through the establishment of special relationships based on their
superiority over certain subordinated entities, i.e. colonies, protectorates,
mandates, semi-sovereign states and puppet-states. And here again the
trend of many of these subordinated entities toward a status as independent
international subjects should be shown.
According to the method outlined above, the historian should not disre-
gard those problems of each historical period which are of paramount inter-
est to the contemporary reader. An analysis of the legal relations of the
Roman Era should devote but little attention to such topics as fetiales,
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which belong to municipal custom and ceremony rather than to the origin
of the law of nations. Attention should be given instead to the fascinating
history of the legal relationship between Rome and the various possessions,
colonies, semi-independent powers, federated and allied countries which were
later to be merged into the Roman Empire. If there was an international
community during this classic era, then the Roman Empire was the interna-
tional community, since it actually embraced the better part of the civilized
world under one law. Furthermore, the study of the relationship between
Rome and other political bodies may constitute one of the historical pre-
mises for the understanding of the evolution of many parts of the British
Empire into independent international subjects, a topic which looms large
in the history of the law of nations and to which Professor Nussbaum de-
votes only eight lines.'
The treatment of the main aspects of the history of international law
outlined above would also enable the reader to grasp the full implications
of certain matters of detail. Punctilio in questions of diplomatic precedence
during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries and the fight over the
veto power in the United Nations are both aspects of the trend toward and
the reaction against legal equality of states.
Of course, it will be the task of an intelligent historian to show the inter-
play of various trends and their historical backgrounds. However, he will
have to refrain from any rash generalization. For instance, it is high time
to revise the current opinion that the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, definitely
established the full and exclusive right of the various independent European
states over their territories. In most cases, their power was neither absolute
nor exclusive nor equal over all parts of their territory. On the contrary, it
was limited and diversified in many ways by co-existing powers over various
parts of their lands. These various legal relationships were governed by
what we may now call international law and also by the public law of various
legal systems and by general feudal principles affecting descent and distribu-
tion of the estates of the sovereigns. As late as 1747 Abbe De Mably used
the comprehensive expression "Droit Publique de l'Europe" to embrace this
intricate and confusing web of legal relations. It is doubtful whether the
"Public Law of Europe" of that time should be identified with international
law.6
Prof. Nussbaum has written a valuable volume and these remarks should
not be construed in criticism. They are intended rather to stimulate the
publication of a complete history of international law which would be one
of the more useful achievements of contemporary scholarship in that field.
ANGELO PIERO SERENIt
5. P. 270.
6. See p. 140.
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